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Abstract
The Quantum Oracle Classification (QOC) problem is to classify a function, given only
quantum black box access, into one of several classes without necessarily determining the entire
function. Generally, QOC captures a very wide range of problems in quantum query complexity.
However, relatively little is known about many of these problems.
In this work, we analyze the a subclass of the QOC problems where there is a group structure.
That is, suppose the range of the unknown function A is a commutative group G, which induces
a commutative group law over the entire function space. Then we consider the case where A
is drawn uniformly at random from some subgroup A of the function space. Moreover, there
is a homomorpism f on A, and the goal is to determine f(A). This class of problems is very
general, and covers several interesting cases, such as oracle evaluation1; polynomial interpolation,
evaluation, and extrapolation; and parity. These problems are important in the study of message
authentication codes in the quantum setting, and may have other applications.
We exactly characterize the quantum query complexity of every instance of QOC with group
structure in terms of a particular counting problem. That is, we provide an algorithm for this
general class of problems whose success probability is determined by the solution to the counting
problem, and prove its exact optimality. Unfortunately, solving this counting problem in general
is a non-trivial task, and we resort to analyzing special cases. Our bounds unify some existing
results, such as the existing oracle evaluation and parity bounds. In the case of polynomial
interpolation and evaluation, our bounds give new results for secret sharing and information
theoretic message authentication codes in the quantum setting.
1 Introduction
The quantum oracle classification (QOC) problem is to classify the function, given only quantum
black box access, into one of several classes, perhaps without necessarily determining the entire
function. This very broad class of problems captures many existing quantum query problems in
the literature, including all decisional problems, as well as some computational problems such as
Quantum Polynomial Interpolation [KK11], Quantum Oracle Evaluation [van98], and others.
In this work, we study a subset of the oracle classification problem where the oracles are promised
to belong to a subspaceA of the set of all functions, and the goal is to evaluate some homomorphism
f on the oracle. More precisely, we consider oracles O : X → G, for some input domain X and
codomain G, where G is an abelian group. The group structure of G naturally induces a group
structure on the set of all oracles, where addition of oracles is performed input-by-input. Then we
consider A to be a subgroup of the set of all oracles, and f is a homomorphism on A. We even
1What we call oracle evaluation has been called oracle interrogation by [van98, BZ13]
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consider an “adversarial” setting where the algorithm is allowed to choose f for itself from some
set of “allowed” homomorphisms H, potentially even after making queries to the oracle.
This general class of QOC problems, while excluding many decisional problems, still contains
many computational problems, such as:
Quantum Summation (QSum). The Parity problem asks, given an oracle A : X → {0, 1},
determine the parity of A:
∑
x∈X A(x) mod 2. More generally, we consider the summation problem,
where the goal is to, given A : X → G for an additive group G, determine f(A) = ∑x∈X A(x). It
is easy to see that f is a homomorphism on the function space. Classically, this problem requires
querying the entire domain to achieve any success probability better than random guessing. In
the quantum setting, this problem was initially studied by Farhi et al. [FGGS09] and Beals et
al. [BBC+01], who show that, in the binary case, ⌈|X |/2⌉ queries are sufficient to determine the
parity with probability 1, and with any fewer queries it is impossible to do better than random
guessing. Thus, quantum algorithms can obtain a factor of 2 speedup relative to classical algorithms
in the binary case, even when considering bounded-error algorithms. To the best of our knowledge,
this problem has not been studied in the more general setting. It is natural to ask: does the factor
of 2 speed up generalize to large outputs, or does the speedup vary based on the group?
Quantum Oracle Evaluation (QOE). Given q queries to a function A : X → Y, and k distinct
inputs x1, . . . , xk, evaluate A on each of the xi. That is, output (y1, . . . , yk) where yi = A(xi).
This is encoded as an OCP problem by interpreting Y as ZN , where N = |Y|. Then the map
A 7→ (A(x1), . . . , A(xk)) is a homomorphism on the function space. The “adversarial” setting
corresponds to the algorithm getting to choose the inputs x1, . . . , xk, and hence the homomorphism
f , potentially after making the q queries.
Classically, clearly with q < k queries, it is impossible to do better than randomly guessing k−q
points. In the quantum setting, this problem was initially studied by van Dam [van98], who showed
that in the case of binary outputs, it is possible to set q = 0.5001k, and succeed with overwhelming
probability. Boneh and Zhandry [BZ13] generalize van Dam’s algorithm to general N , and give
an exact matching lower bound. They show that, for any constant N , it is possible to set q to be
a constant fraction of k and succeed with overwhelming probability, though the constant goes to
1 as N grows. For N ≫ k, they show that even for q = k − 1, the best success probability is at
most k/N ≪ 1, showing that in this regime quantum algorithms offer little advantage over classical
algorithms.
Quantum Polynomial Interpolation (QPI). Given q queries to a degree-d polynomial A :
F → F, determine the polynomial A, where F is some finite field. Using the additive group of
F, A forms a subgroup of the space of all functions. Determining the polynomial is equivalent to
determining its coefficients, and the map that takes a degree-d polynomial A to its coefficients is
a homomorphism on A. Thus this is an instance of the group QOC problem. This problem was
first studied by Kane and Kutin [KK11], who show that q ≥ (d + 1)/2 queries are required to
interpolate with probability better than 1/|F|. Boneh and Zhandry [BZ13] show that it is possible
to interpolate with overwhelming probability when q = d − 1. Their techniques can also be used
to show that for q = (d + 1)/2, the success probability is at most 1/q! = 1/((d + 1)/2)!. Thus
q ≥ (d+2)/2 queries are required to interpolate with probability close to 1 for any d ≥ 2. However,
for (d+ 2)/2 < q < d− 1, this problem remained unresolved.
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Quantum Polynomial Evaluation (QPEv). We can also consider several variants of the poly-
nomial interpolation problem. In Polynomial Evaluation, we are tasked with determining the value
of A(xi) for k distinct points x1, . . . , xk. Like Oracle Interrogation, it is straightforward to phrase
Polynomial Evaluation as a group QOC problem. Clearly, if q ≥ k, this problem is easy even with
only classical access: simply query A on each of the xi. Therefore, the interesting case is when q < k.
Notice that for d < k, the problem of evaluating A on k points is equivalent to determining the
polynomial A itself, as the k points can be interpolated to give the entire polynomial. However, for
d ≥ k, polynomial evaluation is potentially an easier problem, which makes lower bounds harder.
This problem relates to information-theoretic message authentication codes (MACs) in the quan-
tum setting. Here, a document is “signed” by interpreting the document as a field element, and
then applying A to it. We require that, after seeing q signed documents, an adversary cannot
produce an additional signed document. In the quantum setting, we allow the adversary to even
see q superpositions of signed documents, and hope that the adversary cannot then produce q + 1
classical signed documents. We even allow the (superpositions) of documents to be chosen by the
adversary, as well as the q + 1 “forged” documents. Such a MAC is called a q-time MAC. When
setting A to be a random degree-d polynomial, this corresponds to the Polynomial Evaluation prob-
lem with k = q+1. Here, it is important to consider the “adversarial” setting, where the adversary
can choose the forged documents after making its queries.
Classically, degree q polynomials suffice for q-time MACs, because q input/output pairs of
a polynomial are insufficient to determine the polynomial at any other points. As Boneh and
Zhandry [BZ13] showed, q queries are sufficient to interpolate a degree q polynomial entirely, so
degree q polynomials are not quantum-secure q-time MACs. Boneh and Zhandry show that degree
3q polynomials are sufficient for q-time MACs, but leave open exactly how high a degree is necessary.
In particular, for 1-time MACs, whereas classically degree 1 is sufficient, quantumly degree 1 is
insufficient, but degree 3 is sufficient. Whether degree 2 polynomials are 1-time MACs is currently
unknown. Answering this question is of practical importance, as the size of the key (that is, the
descrption of the polynomial) and evaluation time grow with the degree.
Quantum Polynomial Extrapolation (QPEx). A final variant of the polynomial interpola-
tion problem we consider is Polynomial Extrapolation. Here, the there is a particular point, say 0.
The adversary is trying to determine A(0), and is given oracle access to the polynomial everywhere
else. Again, it is natural to encode this as a group QOC problem.
This problem relates to a quantum analog of Shamir secret sharing [Sha79]. In secret sharing, a
secret s ∈ F is split into k shares sh1, . . . , shk ∈ F, which are distributed to each of k parties. The
requirement is that any subset of t + 1 parties can reconstruct the secret, but any subset of t or
fewer parties cannot. Shamir builds such a scheme by setting A to be a random degree-t polynomial
conditioned on A(0) = s, and setting shi = A(i). Then from any t+ 1 shares, A can be classically
interpolated, but from any t shares, it cannot. Thus there is a tight threshold, above which the
secret can be reconstructed, and below which the secret remains hidden.
Damgård et al. [DFNS14] explore superposition attacks on such a scheme, where an adversary
can obtain superpositions of shares subsets of up to t users, which corresponds to making t quantum
queries to A. They show that degree-t polynomials are insufficient for such an attack model, a
result that also follows from the fact that degree-t polynomials can be interpolated with t queries.
Therefore, degree d ≥ t+ 1 is required. However, such a polynomial now requires at d+ 1 ≥ t+ 2
honest users to reconstruct. Thus, there is no tight threshold between classical honest reconstruction
3
and quantum dishonest reconstruction.
It is natural to ask, then, what happens if the shares are themselves superpositions. Is it now
possible to have a tight threshold as in the classical case? The hope would be that, for any t, there
is some degree d such that any t quantum queries is insufficient to reconstruct the secret, but t+1
quantum queries are sufficient. This corresponds exactly to asking if the Polynomial Extrapolation
problem has a tight threshold above which the problem can be solved, but below which it cannot.
1.1 Our Results
We give exact bounds on the maximal success probability for a quantum oracle adversary for any
instance of the group QOC problem. That is, we provide an algorithm achieving the maximal
success probability, and show that this probability is exactly optimal. Our expression for this
probability is given as the solution to a certain counting problem that depends on the particular
group QOC instance. Our general bounds show several interesting things:
• Our algorithm is a parallel algorithm, meaning all the queries are made simultaneously in
parallel, rather that sequentially. Yet our lower bound is for arbitrary sequential algorithms.
Thus, for any instance of the group QOC problem, the best possible algorithm is a parallel
algorithm. This is interesting because many quantum speedups require sequential queries; For
example Grover’s algorithm is inherently and necessarily sequential [Zal99]. Such speedups
are not applicable to group QOC instances.
• In the case where the adversary can choose the homomorphism f from some class H, our
algorithm chooses f before making any queries, whereas our lower bound is for algorithms
that may choose f adversarially, after making all queries. Thus, our results show that for any
instance of the group QOC problem, there is no advantage to choosing f at the end. This
greatly generalizes a result of Boneh and Zhandry [BZ13], which show that this holds for the
Oracle Evaluation problem.
• In the case where the homomorphism attains one of two possible values, our analysis shows
that below a certain threshold number of queries it is impossible to do better than randomly
guessing the output, and above the threshold the correct output can be obtained with prob-
ability 1. Thus there is a tight threshold between below which quantum queries are useless
and above which there is an exact quantum algorithm. More generally, the maximum suc-
cess probability is always an integer multiple of the success probability obtained by random
guessing.
• While we state our bounds as average case results, they apply equally well to the worst case.
In particular, our average case lower bound immediately gives a worst case lower bound,
as any algorithm that has success probability at least p in the worst case also has success
probability at least p on average. Moreover, our algorithm is a worst-case algorithm, in that
its success probability is independent of the oracle it is given. This is because the QOC
problem with group structure admits a query-preserving randomized self reduction, meaning
that any worst case oracle can be turned into a random oracle, and a solution for the random
oracle gives a solution for the worst case oracle.
Next, we turn to analyzing the exact bound itself. Unfortunately, in general determining simple
expressions for the solutions to our counting problems is difficult. Instead, we analyze several
special cases, yielding the following results:
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• In the case of Parity (a special case of Summation) and Oracle Evaluation, we re-prove the
existing results [FGGS09, BBC+01, BZ13] using our new characterization, thus unifying these
results.
• In the case of Summation, we generalize the known bounds to computing the sum of outputs,
where the range of A is an arbitrary group G. We show that, as G increases, the quantum
speedup diminishes. In particular, the quantum speedup is a factor of 1+O(1/|G|), even if we
allow bounded error algorithms. For very large G, the quantum speedup becomes negligible.
• For Polynomial Interpolation, we show that q queries to a degree-d polynomial for q ≤ d/2
results in a success probability at most 1/|F|, where F is the field. This reproves a result of
Kane and Kutin [KK11]. We also show that for q ≥ d/2+1, the success probability approaches
1 for |F| ≫ d!. Thus, for constant even d, there is a sharp threshold at d/2, at or below which
interpolation is impossible, and above which interpolation is possible with overwhelming
probability. Interestingly, we show that for q = d/2 + 1/2, the success probability is ≈ 1/q!.
For constant odd d, this is constant, so there is no sharp threshold in this case. Taking q to
be large, however, makes this negligible and gives a sharp threshold at d/2 + 1/2.
• For Polynomial Evaluation, the above result for Interpolation shows that q ≥ d/2+ 1 suffices
to reconstruct the entire polynomial (in the donstant d, large |F| case), and therefore evaluate
it on any number of points. Moreover, q = d/2+1/2 suffices for complete reconstruction with
constant probability (independent of |F| but dependent on d). Thus Polynomial Evaluation is
easy in this regime. Therefore, degree d = 2q−1 polynomials are not secure q-time MACs. On
the flip side, we show that for q ≤ d/2, the success probability in the Polynomial Evaluation
problem vanishes for large F, meaning degree d = 2q polynomials are q-time MACs, which
is the best possible. This improves on the best prior result of Boneh and Zhandry [BZ13],
who show that degree d = 3q are q-time MACs. In particular, this shows that degree-2
polynomials are 1-time MACs, resolving an open question of Boneh and Zhandry.
• For Polynomial Extrapolation, our Interpolation result again shows that q ≥ d/2 + 1 suffices
to reconstruct the polynomial and evaluate at 02. We show that for q ≤ d/2, it is impossible
to do better than random guessing, again reproving a result of Kane and Kutin [KK11].
Therefore, for even d, we have a tight threshold at d/2 between being unable to reconstruct
the secret and reconstructing the secret. Put another way, to have threshold q, it suffices to
set d = 2q. This shows that quantum secret sharing may be possible with a tight threshold,
though one would need to show that the shares can be created in such a way as to allow for
reconstruction.
One may ask if d = 2q − 1 suffices for secret sharing with threshold q, as using lower degrees
could improve efficiency. For odd d, we show for some field sizes that the secret can be
reconstructed with probability ≈ 1/q for q = d/2 + 1/2, and we conjecture this holds for all
field sizes. Since q is always a polynomial, this cannot be made non-negligible by making q
large. Therefore, setting d = 2q − 1 cannot result in a tight threshold, and instead d = 2q is
required.
2Technically, we cannot run the Interpolation algorithm as is, since the Interpolation problem is allowed to evaluate
at 0. However, 0 is just a single point and a negligible fraction of the domain. Eliminating 0 from the queryable
domain therefore results in a negligible decrease in success probability
5
1.2 Our Techniques
In order to establish our characterization of quantum query complexity in terms of a counting
problem, we need to provide an algorithm and a matching lower bound.
For our lower bound, many traditional quantum lower bound techniques such as the adversary
method and its generalizations and the polynomial method cannot give the results we need. One
reason is because these techniques inherently give asymptotic query lower bounds. However, we see
that for the particular instances of the group QOC problem studied here, the the quantum speed up
over classical algorithms is a factor of 2 or less, and we are therefore interested in the exact number
of queries required to solve the problem. An asymptotic bound here is relatively meaningless.
Instead, our lower bound is based on the Rank method of Boneh and Zhandry [BZ13], which does
give exact lower bounds. There, they show that the maximal success probability of any quantum
query algorithm is bounded by the success probability of random guessing, times a quantity called
the “rank” of the algorithm. The rank of a quantum algorithm is just the dimension of the space
spanned by possible output states of the algorithm on different oracles. Boneh and Zhandry also
give a bound on the rank for any oracle algorithm, which equal to the solution to a very simple
counting problem: the number of functions that differ from 0 on at most q points. For the case of
Polynomial Interrogation, the resulting bound turns out to be exactly optimal.
Unfortunately, Boneh and Zhandry’s general bound on the rank is too weak for many interesting
problems. One problem is that the bound on the rank applies in the case where the oracle can be
any possible function. However, in many settings, the oracle is restricted: for example in polynomial
interpolation, the function is a degree-d polynomial. Therefore, while the exiting bounds on rank
for general oracles give some bound on the success probability in the restricted setting, it is unlikely
to be optimal.
Another problem is that, even if a new tighter rank bound is obtained, it will often give a
meaningless result for the maximal success probability. In particular, the rank method appears
to be most useful when the goal is to determine the the oracle completely, and typically gives
meaningless bounds if the goal is to determine some partial information about the oracle. This is
because every possible oracle the adversary may be given could potentially contribute to the rank.
Therefore, even if the rank is much smaller than the number of possible oracles, it will still be quite
large. If the goal is to determine only a small amount of information about the oracle (meaning
the random guessing probability is not too small), the rank method will give meaningless results.
To make this concrete, consider the case of Polynomial Extrapolation. With q = d/2 queries,
an analysis of our algorithm for the Polynomial Interpolation problem shows that the rank of a
quantum algorithm making q queries to a degree d = 2q polynomial can be as high as roughly
|F|2q/q!. If we try to apply the rank method directly to Polynomial Extrapolation, which has a
random-guessing success probability of 1/|F|, we get an upper bound of |F|2q−1/q! ≫ 1 for the
success probability.
To overcome these difficulties, we extend the rank analysis of Boneh and Zhandry to handle
density matrices. That is, for every possible value v in the image of of the homomorphism f , we
consider the density matrix of final states obtained when given oracle access to a random oracle A
conditioned on f(A) = v. Our goal is to bound the ability to distinguish these density matrices
for different v. In general, this appears to be a very difficult problem. However, we use the
group structure of the problem to reduce analyzing the distinguishing probability for these density
matrices to analyzing the distinguishing probability of certain pure states. We can then bound the
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dimension of the space spanned by these pure states (which can be thought of as the effective rank
of the algorithm) as the result of a particular counting problem. Then applying the Rank method
of Boneh and Zhandry gives the final result.
For our algorithm, we set up a superposition of parallel queries, where each vector of inputs
corresponds to one item in the counting problem. We then show that, after making all of the
queries in parallel, the resulting states are in a sense maximally distinguishable. We obtain a
success probability that exactly equals the bound obtained above.
Finally, to actually apply our general group QOC result, we need to solve the obtained counting
problem for the particular instances of interest. This turns out to be a non-trivial task, and the
problem has very different structures depending on which problem we are solving. Nonetheless,
we give solutions to the problem in the case of QSum, QUE, QPI,QPEv, and QPEx, yielding our
results outlined above.
1.3 Independent and Concurrent Work
In a very recent concurrent and independent work, Childs et al. [CvHS15] also give exact bounds for
the Polynomial Interpolation problem discussed above. In particular, they show that the optimal
success probability relates to a particular counting problem. The counting problem they obtain is
exactly the same problem we obtain when applying our new technique to the Polynomial Interpola-
tion problem. Thus their main result is a special case of our analysis. They do not analyze the other
related problems, such as Polynomial Evaluation or Polynomial Extrapolation. However, they go a
step further in their analysis of the Polynomial Interpolation problem, and give efficient quantum
algorithms with essentially optimal success probability. In contrast, our quantum algorithm, due
to its generality in being able to handle any oracle classification problem with group structure, is
not efficient.
2 Preliminaries
We will assume familiarity with basic group theory. Fix a commutative group G. A character
ξ : G → C× of G is any homomorphism from G to the multiplicative group of non-zero complex
numbers C× — that is, ξ(g + h) = ξ(g)ξ(h). If G has order n, it is easy to see that ξ(g) must be
an nth root of unity for every g ∈ G. The characters of G form a commutative group with the
multiplicative group law (ξ · ξ′)(g) = ξ(g)ξ′(g). Call this group Gˆ. It is known that Gˆ is isomorphic
to G. For any character ξ, it is straightforward to show that
∑
g∈G ξ(g) is zero, unless ξ is the
trivial homomorphism that is identically 1, in which case the sum is |G|.
Given an integer N , let ωN = e
i2π/N , which is a primitive Nth-root of unity.
Quantum query model. Let X be a set, G be a finite commutative group (written additively),
and consider a function A : X → G. The usual model for quantum queries to A is the controlled-add
model. Here, a query to A is the unitary operation defined by
|x, g, z〉 → |x, g +A(x), z〉
Alternatively, one can consider the phase model for quantum queries. A phase query to A is
the unitary operation defined by
|x, ξ, z〉 → ξ(A(x))|x, ξ, z〉
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where ξ is a character of G. The phase model and controlled-add model are actually equivalent,
by conjugating with the quantum group Fourier transform unitary, defined by
|x, g, z〉 → 1√|G|
∑
ξ∈Gˆ
ξ(g)|x, ξ, z〉
For this work, we will mainly use the phase query model, as it will make our calculations easier;
our results also apply equally well to the controlled-add model.
3 Oracle Classification With Group Structure
Let G be a commutative group (written additively) and X some input space. Then the set O of
functions O : X → G inherits a group law from G: (O + O′)(x) = O(x) + O′(x). Consider a
subgroup A of O, and consider the uniform distribution on this set. Consider a homomorphism f
from A to some other arbitrary group.
Group Quantum Oracle Classification (Group QOC) Problem. The oracle classification
problem is to, given q quantum oracle queries to a function A drawn at random from A, determine
f(A). Again, the goal is to devise an algorithm that maximizes the success probability.
Special Case: Group Quantum Oracle Identification (Group QOI). The oracle identifi-
cation problem is to, given q quantum oracle queries to a function A drawn at random from A,
determine A completely. The goal is to devise an algorithm that maximizes the success probability.
Notice that by setting f to be the identity on A, the oracle identification problem is a special case
of the oracle classification problem.
Generalization to Adversarially-chosen f . A generalization of the Group QOC problem
allows the adversary itself to choose the homomorphism f . That is, the adversary makes q quantum
queries to A, and then outputs a homomorphism f together with f(A). Of course, this problem is
trivial if we place no restrictions on f : the adversary can simply output the trivial homomorphism
for f , in which case f(A) is zero. However, we will require that f comes from some restricted set
H of subgroups.
It may seem that allowing the adversary to choose f will give it extra power: based on the
oracle queries made, the adversary can choose f to increase his chances of outputting a good value
f(A). We argue, using a generalization of a technique of Boneh and Zhandry [BZ13], that the
adversary might as well just choose a single f up front and always output that f .
Lemma 3.1. Let H be a set of homomorphisms of A. Let Q be an algorithm making q quantum
queries to an oracle A drawn from A. Suppose with probability ǫ, Q outputs a homomorphism f
and the correct value f(A). Then there is a fixed homomorphism f and quantum algorithm Q′ such
that Q′ outputs f(A) with probability at least ǫ.
Proof. First let Q0 be the following modification to Q: Q0, given quantum oracle access to a
function A ∈ A, chooses a random A0 ∈ A at random and simulates Q with oracle A′ = A + A0.
Answering each of the oracle queries of Q requires only a single oracle query to A. When Q outputs
f, v′, Q0 outputs f, v = v′ − f(A0).
We make two observations:
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• If Q succeeds, then v′ = f(A′) = f(A + A0) = f(A) + f(A0). Thus v = v′ − f(A0) = f(A),
and thus Q0 succeeds. Therefore, Q0 succeeds with probability ǫ. Moreover, this probability
is independent of the oracle f .
• The oracle seen by Q is independent of the oracle A seen by Q0. In particular, this means
that B is independent of A.
Thus we have modified our algorithm so that f is independent of A without hurting the success
probability. The new Q0 is no longer a pure algorithm since it flips coins (to choose A0), but it
can be easily made pure by using a uniform superposition of all coins. Let pf the the probability
of obtaining f , and let ǫf be the probability of success, conditioned on obtaining f . Then ǫ =∑
f∈H pf ǫf . In particular, there exists a f∗ such that ǫf∗ ≥ ǫ. Fix this f∗. We now devise an
algorithm that always outputs f∗, and succeeds with probability ǫf∗ . Thus is sufficient for proving
the lemma.
Let |ψ0〉 be the initial state of Q0 before the first oracle query. Let |ψf 〉 be the following state.
Run Q0 on the function A = 0 until just before the final measurement. Measure the subspace
register, obtaining f with probability pf (since the probability of obtaining f is independent of
A). Un-compute the entire procedure; the new “initial” state obtained is |ψf 〉. Notice that if we
re-compute Q0 using oracle f = 0 on this initial state, we will always obtain the same f . Moreover,
the success probability will be exactly ǫf since the success probability is independent of A, and
instead only depends on f .
We now describe the algorithm Q′. Q′ runs Q0, except that is uses the initial state |ψf∗〉 instead
of |ψ0〉. Since f is independent of the oracle A, Q′ will always output f∗ (which would be obtained
if the oracle was A = 0). Moreover, Q′ has success probability ǫf∗ .
Given Lemma 3.1, it suffices to consider the case where there is just a single fixed homomorphism
f .
4 Our Main Theorem
LetO be the group of all functions from X to G, and letA be a subgroup. Let f be a homomorphism
from A into some other group. Let B be the kernel of the homomorphism, and C be the quotient
group A/B, interpreted as a subgroup of A. Then determining f(A) for an element A ∈ A is
equivalent to determining which coset of B A belongs to, which amounts to finding a C ∈ C such
that A− C ∈ B.
Consider a set of inputs x = {x1, . . . , xq} ∈ X q and a vector ξ = {ξ1, . . . , ξq} ∈ Gˆq. For O ∈ O,
let O(x) = (O(x1), . . . , O(xq)) ∈ Gq be the result of applying O on each of the xi. For g ∈ Gq, let
ξ(g) =
∏q
i=1 ξi(gi).
Define ex,ξ : A → C× as ex,ξ(A) = ξ(A(x)) =
∏q
i=1 ξi(A(xi)). Notice that ex,ξ is a character of
A: that is, a homomorphism from A into C×. Let EA,q be the space of all functions ex,ξ. Notice
that there may be collisions in that ex,ξ = ex′,ξ′ as functions while (x, ξ) 6= (x′, ξ′) (for example,
permuting the values in both x and ξ by the same permutation yields the same function). We
will consider such ex,ξ, ex′,ξ′ to be the same function. In particular, this means that |EA,q| will be
smaller than the set of pairs (x, ξ).
The subgroup B induced by the homomorphism f induces an equivalence relation ≡f on EA,q,
where e ≡f e′ if e and e′ are identical on B. For a function e ∈ EA,q, let EA,q,f,e = {e′ ∈ EA,q :
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e ≡f e′} be the equivalence class induced by f that e belongs to. Let EA,q,f = {EA,q,f,e} be the set
of equivalence classes.
Theorem 4.1. The maximum success probability of any quantum algorithm at solving the quantum
oracle classification problem for (A, f) given q quantum queries is exactly
PA,q,f ≡ 1|C| maxe∈EA,q |EA,q,f,e| =
|B|
|A| maxe∈EA,q |EA,q,f,e|
Notice that ex,ξ is indifferent to simultaneously permuting the coordinates of x and ξ. Also
note that e(x1,...,xq−1,xq−1),(ξ1,...,ξq−1,ξq) = e(x1,...,xq−1,xq−1),(ξ1,...,ξq−1·ξq,1) where 1 is the character that
maps all of G to 1. Therefore, when enumerating the ex,ξ, is suffices to consider x whose elements
are distinct, and in sorted order (according to some arbitrary ordering on X ). Therefore, we will
consider the vector x as a set of q elements in X .
Before proving the theorem, we give an alternative formulation that is significantly easier to
use. This formulation loses some generality, but covers all of the cases considered in this work.
Decompose G as G = ZN1 × · · · × ZNk . Component-wise multiplication yields a ring structure on
G. Then the space O of all oracles actually forms a G-module. Suppose A,B, C are now actually
submodules of O, and moreover suppose they are free submodules (that is, they have a basis).
It is then straightforward to show that a character ξ on G is a map of the following form:
g = (g1, . . . , gk) 7→ ωr1g1N1 ω
r2g2
N2
· · ·ωrkgkNk = ωrg
where ω = (ωN1 , . . . , ωNk) is the vector of primitive Nkth roots of unity, r = (r1, . . . , rk) ∈ G
is some element in G. r then completely describes the character ξ. Now, using the assumption
that B has basis B1, . . . , Bs and C has basis C1, . . . , Ct, any element A in A can be written as
A =
∑s
ℓ=1 βℓBℓ +
∑t
m=1 γmCm. We see that
ex,ξ(
s∑
ℓ=1
βℓBℓ +
t∑
m=1
γmCm) =
( q∏
i=1
s∏
ℓ=1
ωriBℓ(xi)βℓ
)( q∏
i=1
t∏
m=1
ωriCm(xi)γm
)
=
(
s∏
ℓ=1
ω〈r,Bℓ(x)〉βℓ
)(
t∏
m=1
ω〈r,Cm(x)〉γm
)
where r = (r1, . . . , rq) is the vector of ri’s that define the ξi’s. The quantities hℓ = 〈r, Bℓ(x)〉
and zm = 〈r, Cm(x)〉 as ℓ,m vary characterize the action of ex,ξ on A, in that there is a bijective
correspondence between the vector pairs h = (h1, . . . , hs), z = (z1, . . . , zt) and the ex,ξ. Moreover,
h characterizes the action on B. Therefore, if e has vectors h, z and e′ has vectors h′, z′, the e ≡f e′
if and only if h = h′.
Lastly, notice that we can write
h =


B1(x1) B1(x2) · · · B1(xq)
B2(x1) B2(x2) · · · B2(xq)
...
...
. . .
...
Br(x1) Br(x2) · · · Br(xq)

 · r = B(x) · r
We can also conclude that z = C(x) · r, where C(x) is defined analogously to B(x). This gives
rise to the following corollary:
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Corollary 4.2. Given module A, submodule B, and quotient module C, let B be spanned by func-
tions B1, . . . , Br and C be spanned by C1, . . . , Cs. Let
B(x) =


B1(x1) B1(x2) · · · B1(xq)
B2(x1) B2(x2) · · · B2(xq)
...
...
. . .
...
Br(x1) Br(x2) · · · Br(xq)

 C(x) =


C1(x1) C1(x2) · · · C1(xq)
C2(x1) C2(x2) · · · C2(xq)
...
...
. . .
...
Cs(x1) Cs(x2) · · · Cs(xq)


Then the maximum success probability of any algorithm for the QOC problem on A, f given q
queries is exactly
1
|C| maxh |{z : ∃x, r, z = C(x), B(x) · r = h}|
Therefore, understanding the maximal success probability amounts to understanding the ma-
trices B(x),C(x) and the spaces spanned by them.
In Section 5, we will the version of Theorem 4.1 given in Corollary 4.2 for several applications.
Next, we prove Theorem 4.1.
4.1 The Algorithm
Fix a function e∗ ∈ EA,q. We will show how to build a quantum query algorithm achieving success
probability
|EA,q,f,e∗ |
|C| . By choosing the optimal e
∗, we obtain an algorithm with success probability
PA,q,f . Let Sx,ξ denote the number of (x′, ξ′) pairs such that ex′,ξ′ = ex,ξ.
First, the algorithm will construct the superposition
1
|EA,q,f,e∗|
∑
x,ξ: e
x,ξ ≡f e∗
1√
Sx,ξ
|x, ξ〉
It is straightforward that this superposition is properly normalized.
Next, make q queries in parallel on the superposition. For an oracle A = B + C where B ∈
B, C ∈ C, the resulting state is:
1√
|EA,q,f,e∗ |
∑
x,ξ: e
x,ξ ≡f e∗
ξ(B(x))ξ(C(x))|x, ξ〉√
Sx,ξ
=
e∗(B)√
|EA,q,f,e∗
∑
x,ξ: e
x,ξ ≡f e∗
ex,ξ(C)|x, ξ〉√
Sx,ξ
Notice that the state is independent of B except for an overall phase factor e∗(B). Denote this
state as e∗(B)|ψC〉. Therefore, if we trace out the oracle B, the phase disappears and we get a pure
state |ψC〉. Therefore, our algorithm needs to distinguish the states |ψC〉.
Let T be the matrix whose column vectors are the |ψC〉. Now we examine the entries of
U = T † · T , which consist of the inner products 〈ψC′ |ψC〉. It is straightforward to show that
UC′,C = 〈ψC′ |ψC〉 = 1|EA,q,f,e∗ |
∑
e∈EA,q,f,e∗
e(C − C ′)
Assume for the moment that U is full rank. We will measure in the basis R = (RC)c∈C =
T · U−1/2, which can be verified to be a basis. The probability that we measure C is |〈RC , ψC〉|2.
Averaging over all C, the probability that we guess C is
1
|C|
∑
C
|〈RC , ψC〉|2 = 1|C|Tr
2(R† · T ) = 1|C|Tr
2(U1/2) (4.1)
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where Tr2 is the sum of squares of diagonal entries.
Now, if U is not full rank, we can use a pseudoinverse in constructing R, and it is straightforward
to show that Equation 4.1 still holds.
Next, we claim that U2C′,C =
|C|
|EA,q,f,e∗ |UC′,C . Indeed,
U2C′,C =
∑
C′′
UC′,C′′UC′′,C =
1
|EA,q,f,e∗|2
∑
e,e′∈EA,q,f,e∗ ,C′′
e(C − C ′′)e′(C ′′ − C ′)
=
1
|EA,q,f,e∗ |2
∑
e,e′∈EA,q,f,e∗
e(C)e′(−C ′)
∑
C′′∈C
(e′/e)(C ′′)
Next, e′/e, when restricted to C, is a character of C, and if e 6= e′ when restricted to C, then
this character is not identically 1. This means that if e 6= e′ on C, then the sum ∑C′′(e′/e)(C ′′)
will vanish. Otherwise, if they are equal on C, the sum will become |C|. Therefore, U2C′,C becomes
U2C′,C =
|C|
|EA,q,f,e∗ |2
∑
e∈EA,q,f,e∗
e(C − C ′) = |C||EA,q,f,e∗ |UC
′,C
as desired.
Now we take the square root of both sides, obtaining U
1/2
C′,C =
√
|EA,q,f,e∗ |√
|C| UC′,C . Notice that the
diagonal elements of this quantity are all
√
|EA,q,f,e∗√
|C| since UC,C = 1 due to normalization. Squaring
and summing over all C, we obtain that Tr2(U1/2) = |EA,q,f,e∗|. This gives the desired success
probability of |EA,q,f,e∗ |/|C|.
4.2 The Lower Bound
Now we prove our lower bound (that is, our upper bound on the success probability). At a high
level, our result will use the Rank Method of Boneh and Zhandry [BZ13]. However, the rank of
an algorithm in our case is too high: the rank grows with the number of oracles (|A|), but we are
trying to identify an oracle in a potentially much smaller set (|C|). Therefore, we will have to be
careful in our application of this method.
Consider a general algorithm Q, and suppose that Q has probability ǫ in solving the oracle
classification problem for A, f . Let B, C be the subgroups of A induced by f . Let A ∈ A be the
oracle seen by Q, and write A = B + C for oracles B ∈ B, C ∈ C. The goal of Q is to determine
C. To that end, we will consider the final density matrices of Q, denoted ρC , obtained by fixing
C, but letting B vary. Our goal is to bound the the distinguishability of the density matrices ρC .
Unfortunately, beyond distinguishing two density matrices, we do no know of any general solution
that, given a set of density matrices, determines how distinguishable they are. Instead, we will
have to use particular properties of the ρC to argue indistinguishability.
It is straightforward to show that the state |ψA〉 obtained by running Q on oracle A, but
stopping just before the final measurement, can be written as
|ψA〉 =
∑
x∈X q,ξ∈Gˆq ,z∈Z
Ux,ξ,zξ(A(x))|z〉
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Here, the quantities Ux,ξ,z are determined solely by the algorithm Q and independent of A, and
Z is some set: z ∈ Z encodes the output C ′ ∈ C, as well as some auxiliary information that is
discarded.
As ξ(A(x)) = ex,ξ(A) and A = B + C, we can write this as
|ψA〉 =
∑
x,ξ,z
Ux,ξ,zex,ξ(B)ex,ξ(C)|z〉
We will now modify Q to obtain Q′ that will have the same success probability as Q. Q′ chooses
a random D ∈ C, and simulates Q with oracle access to A′ = A+D = B + C +D, by forwarding
the queries Q makes to its own oracle A, and then performing a D oracle query itself. Since Q′
created D, making the D oracle query does not cost Q′ any queries to A. Q′ simply outputs the
z outputted by Q, as well as D. Q still sees a random oracle drawn from A, so with probability
ǫ its output z will encode correct coset C +D. From this and knowledge of D, we can recover C.
Therefore, Q′ still succeeds with probability ǫ.
We can write the final state of this modified algorithm as
|ψ′A〉 =
1√|C|
∑
x,ξ,z,D
Ux,ξ,zex,ξ(B)ex,ξ(C)ex,ξ(D)|z,D〉
The density matrix ρC obtained by taking a random sample from |ψ′B+C〉 as B varies is then:
ρC =
1
|C|
∑
B,x,ξ,z,D,x′,ξ′,z′,D′
Ux,ξ,zU
†
x′,ξ′,z′ex,ξ(B)ex,ξ(C +D)ex′,ξ′(−B)ex′,ξ′(−C −D′)|z,D〉〈z′,D′|
Now we isolate
∑
B ex,ξ(B)ex′,ξ′(−B) =
∑
B(ex,ξ/ex′,ξ′)(B). If ex,ξ 6= ex′,ξ′ when restricted to
B, then (ex,ξ/ex′,ξ′) is a character of B that is not identically 1. In this case, the sum goes to
0. If ex,ξ = ex′,ξ′ when restricted to B, then the sum goes to |B|. This has the effect of forcing
ex,ξ ≡f ex′,ξ′ in the expression for ρC . Therefore, we can write
ρC =
∑
e∗∈EA,q,f
pe∗ |φC,e∗〉〈φC,e∗ |
Where
∑
e∗∈EA,q,f means that exactly one e
∗ is chosen arbitrarily from each equivalence class
on EA,q induced by ≡f , and where
pe∗ =
|B|
|C|
∑
z,D
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x,ξ: e
x,ξ ≡f e∗
Ux,ξ,zex,ξ(C +D)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
|C|
∑
z,D
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x,ξ: e
x,ξ ≡f e∗
Ux,ξ,zex,ξ(D)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
|φC,e∗〉 = 1√
pe∗
√
|B|
|C|
∑
z,D,x,ξ: e
x,ξ ≡f e∗
Ux,ξ,zex,ξ(C +D)|z,D〉
Notice that p∗e does not depend on C. Also,
∑
e∗ pe∗ = 1 — while it is not obvious given the
expressions above that this should hold, it follows easily from the fact that the density matrix has
trace 1 and the |φC,e∗〉 are properly normalized.
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We can therefore think of the algorithm Q′ as acting in a different model where it gains access
to C in the following way: Q′ is simply given e∗3, sampled with probability pe∗, as well as the pure
state |φC,e∗〉, and its goal is to determine C. We now bound the probability that it can do so.
The Rank method of Boneh and Zhandry [BZ13] then gives us the following. Conditioned on
receiving e∗, which is independent of C, the maximum success probability is at most 1|C| times the
dimension of the space spanned by the vectors |φC,e∗〉 for various C.
Fix some e∗. Notice that we can write |φC,e∗〉 as:
|φC,e∗〉 =
∑
e∈EA,q,f,e∗ : e ≡f e∗
e(C)|ξ(e∗)e 〉
Where
|ξ(e∗)e 〉 =
1√
pe∗
√
|B|
|C|
∑
z,D

 ∑
x,ξ: e
x,ξ=e
Ux,ξ,ze(D)

 |z,D〉
Therefore, for each C, |φC,e∗〉 is linear combination of the basis functions |ξ(e
∗)
e 〉 for e ∈ EA,q,f,e∗.
Therefore, the space spanned by the |φC,e∗〉 as C varies (but e∗ remains fixed) has dimension at most
|EA,q,f,e∗ |. Therefore, the success probability, conditioned on receiving e∗, is at most |EA,q,f,e∗ |/|C|.
The overall success probability is at most the maximum of this quantity as we vary e∗, or
1
|C| maxe∗∈EA,q |EA,q,f,e∗ | = PA,q,f
This completes the proof.
5 Applications
5.1 Parity
The parity problem asks, given an oracle A : [0,M − 1]→ G, to compute M(G) =∑x∈X A(x).
Theorem 5.1. The maximum success probability of any q-query quantum algorithm in the Parity
problem is
min
(⌊M/(M − q)⌋
|G| , 1
)
We make the following observations:
• In the case |G| = 2, we obtain that the success probability is 12⌊M/(M − q)⌋. For q < M/2,
this is equal to 1/2, meaning the best quantum algorithm cannot beat random guessing.
Meanwhile, for q ≥ M/2, the success probability becomes 1, meaning the parity can be
computed with certainty. This re-establishes the known bounds for the parity function due
to Farhi et al. [FGGS09] and Beals et al. [BBC+01].
• For more general G, the success probability is piecewise constant as q varies, an increases by
1/|G| each time q crosses ℓ−1ℓ M for integers M .
3Actually, providing e∗ to Q′ gives Q′ potentially more power in determining C. This can only make the lower
bound harder. In particular, proving a lower bound for Q′ that is given e∗ implies a lower bound for Q that is not
given e∗
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• To achieve success probability 1, q ≥ ⌈M(1− 1|G|)⌉. In particular, forM < |G|, q =M queries
are required to achieve a perfect algorithm.
• Setting q =M −1, the maximum success probability is M/|G|. Thus for quantum algorithms
to be able to save even a single query relative to classical algorithms in the bounded error
setting, it must be that M = Ω(|G|).
• If error p is tolerated, then approximately q ≈ (1− 1p|G|)M queries are required. For exponen-
tial |G| and non-negligible p, all but a negligible fraction M queries must be made. Therefore,
the advantage over classical algorithms is negligible.
Now we prove Theorem 5.1. Let B be the kernel of f : that is, the set of A such that∑x∈X A(x) =
0. The quotient group can be taken to be C, the set of functions A such that A(x) = 0 for all x 6= 0.
Decompose G as G = ZN1 ×· · ·×ZNk , and make G a ring using component-wise multiplication.
The unit in this ring is the all-1s vector. Notice that B and C are free modules over this ring
structure. For B, use the basis {By}y∈X\{0} where
By(x) =


−1 if x = 0
1 if x = y
0 otherwise
For C we use the basis consisting of C0(x) =
{
1 if x = 0
0 otherwise
. Let B(x) be the (M − 1) × q
matrix
B(x) =


B1(x1) B1(x2) · · · B1(xq)
B2(x1) B2(x2) · · · B2(xq)
...
...
. . .
...
BM−1(x1) BM−1(x2) · · · BM−1(xq)


Fix some h in GM−1. We need to consider the set of (x, r) such that B(x) · r = h. Consider
some x. There are two cases:
• x does not contain 0. In this case, the only rows of B(x) that are non-zero are those corre-
sponding to the elements in x, of which there are q (recall that we can assume the elements
in x are distinct). Therefore, the column span of this matrix contains vectors that are zero
everywhere outside positions corresponding to the elements of x. In particular, if h is in the
image of B(x), then h must be zero on at least M − 1− q points.
• x contains 0. Since we assume x is ordered, x1 = 0. Then B(x) will be −1 everywhere in
the first column. The remaining columns will have exactly a single 1 in them. Therefore,
B(x) · r will be the vector that is −r1 everywhere, plus a vector that is non-zero in at
most q − 1 positions. Thus if h = B(x) · r, it must be that h is equal to −r1 on at least
M − 1− (q − 1) =M − q points.
In either case, B(x) is full rank (since we assume the elements of x are distinct). Therefore, for
any x, there is at most one r.
Next, we consider values of z = C0(x) · r for values (x, r) satisfying the above. There are two
cases:
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• x does not contain 0. In this case, C0(x) is zero everywhere, so z = 0, regardless of r
• x contains 0 (so x1 = 0). Then z = r1.
Therefore, for every non-zero possible value of z, at least M − q points of h are equal to (the
negative of) that value. Moreover if 0 is a possible value of z, h is zero on at least M − 1− q points.
Therefore, if there are k distinct possible values of z, it must be that
M − 1 ≥ (k − 1)(M − q) +M − q − 1⇐⇒ k ≤ M
M − q
Therefore k = ⌊M/(M − q)⌋ is an upper bound on the number of possible k values. It is also
straightforward to show that this bound is attainable, as long as the bound is at most 1. Since
|C| = |G|, we have that the best probability of success of any q-query algorithm is:
min
(⌊M/(M − q)⌋
|G| , 1
)
5.2 Oracle Interrogation
The oracle interrogation problem asks, given an oracle A : X → G, to output k distinct input/output
pairs given only q quantum queries, where q < k. Let M = |X | and N = |G|.
Theorem 5.2. The maximum success probability of any q query quantum algorithm in the Oracle
Interrogation problem is:
1
Nk
q∑
i=0
(
M
i
)
(N − 1)i
This reproves the bound given by Boneh and Zhandry [BZ13]. To prove Theorem 5.2, we
rephrase Oracle Interrogation as a Quantum Oracle Classification problem. The k distinct inputs
produced by the adversary specify the homomorphism that maps a function A to its outputs on
those k points. The k outputs produced by the adversary are then the adversary’s attempt to
evaluate the homomorphism. Using Lemma 3.1, we know that it suffices fix a set of k distinct
inputs, say S, and consider an adversary that tries to evaluate A on just those inputs.
B, the kernel of the homomorphism defined by S, consists of functions that are zero on S, and
quotient group C can be taken to consist of functions that are zero everywhere except S.
As with parity, we can assign a ring structure to G, and B, C will be free modules over G. Let
By(x) =
{
1 if x = y
0 otherwise
. Then B is spanned by By for y /∈ S, and C is spanned by By for y ∈ S.
Let B(x),C(x) be as in Corollary 4.2. The possible values of z = C(x) · r are just the vectors of
length k that are non-zero on at most q points. Of course, we need to choose some h and restrict
to (x, r) such that h = B(x) · r. It is straightforward to see that setting h = 0 will still allow all
vectors of at most q points even after the restriction.
Thus, the total number of z is
q∑
i=0
(
M
i
)
(N − 1)i
So the maximum success probability is
1
Nk
q∑
i=0
(
M
i
)
(N − 1)i
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5.3 Polynomial Interpolation
The polynomial interpolation problem asks, given a random degree-d polynomial A over a field F,
to determine the d+ 1 coefficients of A. We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5.3. The maximum success probability of a q-query algorithm in the polynomial inter-
polation problem is
1. At most 1|F| if q ≤ d2
2. Between 1q!
(
1− (q+12 ) 1|F|
)
and 1q! if q =
d
2 +
1
2
3. At least 1− (d/2+1)!+d+1|F| if q ≥ d2 + 1
In particular, for |F| ≫ d!, we have that the maximum success probability is vanishingly small
for q ≤ d2 , is roughly 1q! for q = d2 + 12 , and is overwhelming for d2 + 1. Thus, for even d, there is a
sharp threshold at d/2, exactly half the threshold of the classical setting. For odd d, however, the
story depends on how large d and q are. If d and q are taken to be logarithmic or larger, so that 1/q!
is negligible, then there is a sharp threshold as q goes from d/2+1/2 to d/2+3/2. However, if d, q
are constants, then there is no sharp threshold at all: the success probability goes from vanishing
at d/2 − 1/2 to constant at d/2 + 1/2 to overwhelming at d/2 + 3/2.
Now we prove Theorem 5.3. The homomorphism for Polynomial Interpolation is just the identity
homomorphism. Thus the kernel B is just the zero function, and C is the set of all degree-d
polynomials. C is spanned by the functions Ci(x) = xi for i = 0, . . . , d. Therefore, the matrix C(x)
in Corollary 4.2 is just the Vandermonde matrix
C(x) =


1 1 · · · 1
x1 x2 · · · xq
...
...
. . .
...
xd1 x
d
2 · · · xdq


Meanwhile, the B matrix is empty, meaning there is no constraint on the x, r pairs allowed.
Our goal, therefore, is to count the number of vectors z that can be represented as z = C(x) · r for
x that are subsets of |F| of size q, and r ∈ |F|q. Let Nd,q be the number of such distinct vectors.
Then the total success probability by Corollary 4.2 is Nd,q/|F|d+1.
We can trivially bound Nd,q from above by
(|F|
q
)|F|q ≤ |F|2q/q!. This gives us the upper bounds
in parts 1 and 2.
For the lower bound in part 2, we want to show that the number of vectors is close to the
number of pairs (x, r). Suppose that two distinct pairs (x, r) and (x′, r′) map to the same vector:
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C(x) · r = C(x′) · r′. We can write this equation as:
0 =M · s =


1 1 · · · 1 1 1 · · · 1
x1 x2 · · · xq x′1 x′2 · · · x′q
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
xd1 x
d
2 · · · xdq x′d1 x′d2 · · · x′dq

 ·


r1
r2
...
rq
−r′1
−r′2
...
−r′q


(5.1)
Since we are considering the case where d + 1 = 2q, the matrix M is square. Moreover, M is
also a Vandermonde matrix, and it is full rank if x and x′ do not overlap. In this case, the only
solution is s = 0, which means r = r′ = 0. If there is an overlap between x,x′, reorder x,x′ so
that the first k elements are identical, and the remaining q − k are distinct, and apply the same
reordering to r, r′. We can then rewrite Equation 5.1 as
0 =M′ · s′ =


1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1
x1 · · · xk xk+1 · · · xq x′k+1 · · · x′q
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
xd1 · · · xdk xdk+1 · · · xdq x′dk+1 · · · x′dq

 ·


r1 − r1′
...
rk − r′k
rk+1
...
rq
r′k+1
...
r′q


(5.2)
Now M′ is full rank, and it is “tall” since its width is 2q − k < 2q and its height is d+ 1 = 2q.
Therefore, the only solution is s′ = 0, which means ri = r′i for i = 1, . . . , k and ri = r
′
i = 0 for
i = k + 1, . . . , q. Notice that since r = r′, it must be that x 6= x′, and therefore k < q. Therefore,
rq = r
′
q = 0.
Thus, if we restrict to r that are non-zero in every coordinate, there are no collisions among the
(x, r). Counting the number of pairs of vectors (x, r) where ri 6= 0∀i then gives us a lower bound on
Nd,q. The number of such vectors is
(|F|
q
)
(|F|− 1)q ≥ |F|2qq!
(
1− (q+12 ) 1|F|
)
. Dividing by |F|d+1 = |F|2q
gives us the lower bound in part 2 of the theorem.
Finally, it remains to prove the lower bound in part 3. Again, the goal is to show that there
are not too many collisions in the function (x, r) 7→ z = C(x) · r. However, this time there
will be many collisions, as the number of pairs is ≈ |F|2q/q!, whereas the co-domain has size
|F|d+1 ≥ |F|2q−1 ≪ |F|2q/q!.
We will prove a lower bound on the number of vectors by proving an upper bound on the collision
probability. That is, we will choose a distribution D on pairs (x, r), and show that collisions happen
with probability at most p. It then follows that the image size must be at least 1/p.
We prove the lower bound in the case q = d/2 + 1; the lower bound easily extends to larger q.
Let D be the distribution that picks x uniformly at random from the subsets of F of size q, and
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r uniformly at random from (F \ {0})q. Consider sampling two pairs (x, r), (x′, r′). We will now
bound the probability they collide. We consider three cases:
• x and x′ do not overlap. Look again at the matrix M from Equation 5.1. This matrix is
no longer square, but is actually wide, since its width is 2q, but its height is d + 1 < 2q.
Therefore, its rank is d + 1, and its null space has dimension 2q − (d + 1) = 1. This means
that s = (r,−r′), which is uniform on (F\{0})2q has probability at most |F|−1
(|F|−1)2q =
1
(|F|−1)d+1
of being in the null space.
• x and x′ overlap but are not equal. In this case, we look at the matrixM′ in Equation 5.2. It
is full rank, and its width is now only 2q − k ≤ d+ 1. Therefore as before, the only solutions
have rq = r
′
q = 0. Since we are restricting to rq 6= 0, there are no collisions in this case.
• x = x′. In this case, we have a collision if and only if r = r′, which happens with probability
1
(|F|−1)2q . Notice that x = x
′ with probability 1/
(|F|
q
)
Therefore the total collision probability is bounded by
1
(|F| − 1)d+1 +
1(|F|
q
)
(|F| − 1)q
The image size of the map (x, r) 7→ C(x)·r is at least the reciprocal of this probability. Through
a straightforward though tedious series expansion for large |F|, the reciprocal can be bounded from
below by
|F|d+1
(
1− q! + 2q − 1|F|
)
Dividing by |F|d+1 and setting q = d/2 + 1 gives the desired result.
Next, we consider two variants of polynomial interpolation.
5.4 Polynomial Evaluation
In the polynomial evaluation problem, we are given oracle access to a random degree-d polynomial
A over a field F, and we are tasked with evaluating the polynomial are certain inputs. Since we can
easily learn as many points as we made queries, our goal is to learn more points than the number
of queries made. Specifically, given q queries, we are asked to produce q + 1 distinct input/output
pairs.
Theorem 5.4. For q ≤ d/2, the maximum success probability of any q-query quantum algorithm
in the Polynomial Evaluation problem is at most (q + 1)qe2
√
q/|F|.
This shows that setting d = 2q suffices for a degree-d polynomial to be a q-time quantum-secure
message authentication code (MAC). This improves on the previously best bound of d = 3q due
to Boneh and Zhandry [BZ13]. In particular, for a 1-time MAC, degree 2 is sufficient. As it is
known that degree 1 is insufficient, this resolves the question for 1-time MACs. More generally, for
any constant q, q queries suffice to recover a degree 2q − 1 polynomial with constant probability.
Therefore, degree d = 2q is required. In the case where q is allowed to grow, a more careful analysis
is required to see if degree 2q is optimal.
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Now we prove Theorem 5.4. Fix any q + 1 distinct inputs Y that the adversary will try to
evaluate A on. The null space B is the set of polynomials that vanish on Y. Such polynomials can
be written as A(x) = Q(x)A′(x) where Q(x) =
∏
y∈Y(x− y) and A′(x) is a random degree d− q− 1
polynomial. This space is spanned by Q(x)xi for i = 1, . . . , d − q − 1. Therefore, the condition
h = B(x) · r can be written as:
h =


Q(x1) Q(x2) · · · Q(xq)
Q(x1)x1 Q(x2)x2 · · · Q(xq)xq
...
...
. . .
...
Q(x1)x
d−q−1
1 Q(x2)x
d−q−1
2 · · · Q(xq)xd−q−1q

 ·


r1
r2
...
rq


=


1 1 · · · 1
x1 x2 · · · xq
...
...
. . .
...
xd−q−11 x
d−q−1
2 · · · xd−q−1q

 ·


Q(x1)r1
Q(x2)r2
...
Q(rq)rq

 =:M′(x) · r′ (5.3)
M′(x) is the usual Vandermonde matrix, which is full rank. Since d ≥ 2q, the matrix is at least
as tall as it is wide, and therefore, for a given h,x, there is exactly one solution for the vector r′.
As r′i = Q(xi)ri, this uniquely determines each of the ri, except in the case that r
′
i = 0 and xi ∈ Y
(so that Q(xi) = 0). If k of the xi are not in Y (so q − k are in Y), we see that the maximum
number of solutions is |F|q−k. The number of x that overlap with Y in q−k points is (q+1q−k)(|F|−q−1k ).
Therefore, for any given h, the total number of (x, r) pairs satisfying Equation 5.3 is therefore at
most
q∑
k=0
(
q + 1
q − k
)(
|F| − q − 1
k
)
|F|q−k ≤
q∑
k=0
(
q + 1
q − k
)
|F|k
k!
|F|q−k ≤ |F|q(q + 1)
q∑
k=0
(
q
k
)
1
k!
=: |F|qNq
Hence this is also a bound on the number of vectors z = C(x) ·r such that B(x) ·r = h. We now
bound Nq. Let k = αq. First, we recall that
( q
αq
) ≤ eHαq where Hα = −(1 − α) ln(1 − α) − α lnα
is the entropy of a coin flip that is heads with probability α. Then we use Stirling’s approximation
to lower bound k! ≥ ek(ln k−1). Therefore, ln
(( q
αq
)
/k!
)
≤ Hαq − αq(ln(αq) − 1) =: Pq(α). It is
straightforward to show that Pq attains a maximum value at α =
−1+√4q+1
2a , and we can bound Pq
at this value by 2
√
q. Thus we can bound the summand in the expression for q as e2
√
q, giving a
total bound of Nq ≤ (q + 1)qe2
√
q.
Hence the number of vectors C(x) · r for any given h is at most (q + 1)qe2√q|F|q. Dividing
by |F|q+1 (the total number of possible outputs on q + 1 points), we obtain a maximum success
probability of (q+1)qe
2
√
q
|F| , as desired.
5.5 Polynomial Extrapolation
In the polynomial extrapolation problem, we are given oracle access to a random degree-d polyno-
mial A over a field F everywhere except a single point, say 0, and we are tasked with evaluating the
polynomial at 0. This problem relates to a generalization of Shamir secret sharing where shares
are superpositions.
Theorem 5.5. The maximum success probability of a q-query quantum algorithm in the Polynomial
Extrapolation problem is:
20
1. 1/|F| if q ≤ d/2.
2. At most ⌊(|F| − 1)/q⌋/|F| ≈ 1/q for q = (d+ 1)/2. Moreover, if q|(|F| − 1), this is tight.
3. At least 1− (d/2+1)!+d+1|F| if q ≥ (d+ 2)/2.
This theorem shows that, for the application to quantum secret sharing discussed in the intro-
duction, even d give a tight threshold between the secret being hidden and being able to compute
the secret with overwhelming probability. However, for odd degree, there is no tight threshold, as
long as (d + 1)/2 divides |F| − 1. This holds even if q is polynomial, in contrast to Polynomial
Interpolation, where large polynomial q give a tight threshold even for odd d. We conjecture that
our bounds for q = (d + 1)/2 are tight for all field sizes, in which case there is no tight threshold
for any field size.
We now prove Theorem 5.5. Here, the kernel B is the set of degree-d polynomials A such that
A(0) = 0 (that is, the set of polynomials with no constant term). Meanwhile, the quotient group C
can be taken to be the set of constant polynomials. Both of these groups form vector spaces: B is
spanned by the polynomials x, . . . , xd, and C is spanned by the constant polynomial 1. Therefore,
the matrix B(x) in Corollary 4.2 for q queries is just the Vandermonde-style matrix
B(x) =


x1 x2 · · · xq
x21 x
2
2 · · · x2q
...
...
. . .
...
xd1 x
d
2 · · · xdq


Meanwhile the matrix C(x) is just C = (1 1 · · · 1). Suppose d ≥ q, in which case B(x) is full
rank for any set x. Pick an h ∈ Fd, and consider the set of solutions to h = B(x) · r. First, since
B(x) is full rank, there is at most a single r for any x. Now, consider an x, r that is a solution. We
want to determine the possible values of z = C · r, which is just the sum of the elements in r.
Let Px(y) = y
q +
∑q−1
i=0 aiy
i be the monic polynomial that is zero on the q points of x. The ai,
as functions of the xj ∈ x, are simply the elementary symmetric polynomials in q variables, up to
a sign factor. In particular, a0 is (up to sign) the product of the xj , and therefore a0 6= 0 (since
x is restricted to be non-zero). Moreover, for a given x ∈ x, ai can be written as ai = bix + bi−1
where the bi are the elementary symmetric polynomials (up to signs) in q − 1 variables, evaluated
on the xj ∈ x \ {x}. This uses the convention that bq−1 = 1, b−1 = 0.
Define aˆi =
ai
a0
for i ∈ [q − 1], and aˆq = 1a0 . Then define Pˆx(y) := 1 +
∑q
i=1 aˆiy
i = 1a0 px(y).
Therefore, Pˆx also has zeros on exactly the points in x. Define aˆ to be the column vector of the
aˆi. Notice that aˆ uniquely determines the polynomial Pˆ , which uniquely determines x, if it exists.
However, aˆ may determine a polynomial Pˆ which does not split over F, or which has multiple roots,
in which case x does not exist. Similarly define bˆ = bib0 . Note that aˆi = bˆi +
1
x bˆi−1. Define bˆ to be
the column vector of the bˆi
First, we observe that −1 =∑qi=1 aˆixij for each xj ∈ x. Define B[1,q](x) to consist of the first q
rows of B(x). Then we observe that aˆT ·B[1,q](x) = (−1 − 1 · · · − 1) = −C. Then we can write
z = C · r = −aˆT ·B[1,q](x) · r = −aˆT · h[1,q]
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where h[1,q] = (h1 h2 . . . hq) is the first q elements of h. Therefore, we can determine z simply
from x and h without computing r. If we fix an x ∈ x, it is straightforward to re-write this as
z = −h1
x
− bˆT · h[1,q−1](x)
Where hi(x) = hi +
1
xhi+1 and h[1,q−1](x) = (h1(x) h2(x) · · · hq−1(x)).
Next, the fact that h = B(x) · r means means h is in the column space of B(x). Define D(x)
to be the matrix
D(x) =


1 aˆ1 · · · aˆq−1 aˆq 0 · · · 0
0 1 aˆ1 · · · aˆq−1 aˆq 0 · · ·
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 1 aˆ1 · · · aˆq−1 aˆq


Notice that D(x) ·B(x) = 0 since Pˆ (xi) = 0 for each xi ∈ x. This means D(x) · h = 0. The
resulting set of equations can be re-written as
H · a =


h2 h3 · · · hq+1
h3 h4 · · · hq+2
...
...
. . .
...
hd−q+1 hd−q+2 · · · hd

 ·


aˆ1
aˆ2
...
aˆq

 = −


h1
h2
...
hd−q

 = −h[1,d−q] (5.4)
If we fix an x ∈ x, it is straightforward to re-write this as
H(x) ·b =


h2(x) h3(x) · · · hq(x)
h3(x) h4(x) · · · hq+1(x)
...
...
. . .
...
hd−q+1(x) hd−q+1(x) · · · hd−1(x)

 ·


bˆ1
bˆ2
...
bˆq−1

 = −


h1(x)
h2(x)
...
hd−q(x)

 = −h[1,d−q](x)
(5.5)
The case d = 2q. In this case, H is a square q × q symmetric matrix. Fix h, which determines
H. If H happened to be full rank, then there would be a unique solution aˆ to the equation above,
meaning a unique set x. In this case there is only a single pair (x, r), meaning only a single z.
We will now show that this is true even if H is not full rank. Pick an arbitrary solution aˆ0 to
H · aˆ0 = −h[1,d−q] = −h[1,q]. Then any solution can be written as aˆ0 + aˆ for some aˆ, where
H · aˆ = 0. Then consider the possible z values, which are −〈hq, aˆ0 + aˆ〉. This can be expressed as
z = (aˆ0 + aˆ)
T · (−h[1,q]) = (aˆ0 + aˆ)T ·H · (aˆ0 + aˆ)
= aˆT0 ·H · aˆ0 + aˆT ·H · aˆ0 + aˆ0 ·H · aˆ + aˆ ·H · aˆ
= aˆT0 ·H · aˆ0 + 0 + 0 + 0
Thus, for any H (and hence for any h), there is exactly one value of z. Applying Corollary 4.2,
we see that the maximal success probability is 1/|F|, the same as random guessing.
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The case d = 2q − 1. In this case, H is no longer square, but instead has dimensions (q − 1)× q.
First, fix an x ∈ F to be included in x. We now wish to count, for any fixed h, the total number of
values z takes on as we vary the other values in x. Recall that we can write z as −h1x −bˆT ·h[1,q−1](x)
where bˆ is a solution to H(x) · bˆ = −h[1,d−q](x) in Equation 5.5. Since x is fixed, it suffices to
count the number of values −bˆT ·h[1,q−1](x) takes on. This counting problem is exactly a “smaller”
instance of the Polynomial Extrapolation problem with q′ = q − 1 queries and degree d′ = d − 1
polynomials. Notice that d′ = 2q′, so this is the problem we already solved above. In particular,
there is at most one z value for this fixed x.
Therefore, every non-zero x ∈ F is associated with at most a single z value. Moreover, for
each z, there are at least q such non-zero x (since each z is derived from some x of q elements).
Therefore, there are at most (|F| − 1)/q possible values of z. This completes the upper bound.
For the lower bound, we consider the case where q|(|F| − 1). This means q divides the order
of the multiplicative group of non-zero elements of F. This means there is a primitive qth root of
unity ω, ωq = 1. We will let h = (0 · · · 0 q 0 · · · 0) be the vector of 2q − 2 0’s with a q in the
middle. Then for any x ∈ F, consider the vector x = (x ωx . . . ωq−1x) and r = (1 1 . . . 1)/xq.
Then the jth row of B(x) is xj · (1 ωj . . . ωj(q−1)). The jth element of B(x) · r is then
q−1∑
i=0
(xωi)j/xq = xj−q
q−1∑
i=0
ωij
Notice that the sum is 0 unless j mod q = 0. As 1 ≤ j ≤ 2q − 1, the only value for which the
sum is non-zero is j = q. Moreover, for j = q, the sum goes to q, and thus the whole qth element
evaluates to q. Thus, B(x) · r = h, as desired.
Now we need to count the number of values z = C(x) · r. Recall that C(x) is just the all-ones
vector, so we get that C(x) · r = q/xq. Since q|(|F| − 1), we know that q is relatively prime to the
characteristic of |F|, so q is non-zero. Moreover, xq, when restricted to non-zero x, is exactly q-to-1.
Therefore, there are (|F| − 1)/q different values for z = q/xq. This completes the lower bound.
The case d < 2q−1. It is straightforward to re-work the analysis from the Polynomial Interpola-
tion case to show that we can still interpolate the polynomial completely in this setting, even though
we can no longer query on 0. In fact, the exact same bound given in the Polynomial Interpolation
setting (namely a success probability of at least 1− (d/2+1)!+d+1|F| ) can be given.
References
[BBC+01] Robert Beals, Harry Buhrman, Richard Cleve, Michele Mosca, and Ronald de Wolf.
Quantum lower bounds by polynomials. J. ACM, 48(4):778–797, July 2001.
[BZ13] Dan Boneh and Mark Zhandry. Quantum-secure message authentication codes. In
Thomas Johansson and Phong Q. Nguyen, editors, Advances in Cryptology – EU-
ROCRYPT 2013, volume 7881 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 592–608,
Athens, Greece, May 26–30, 2013. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[CvHS15] Andrew Childs, Wim van Dam, Shih-Han Hung, and Igor Shparlinski. Optimal quantum
algorithm for polynomial interpolation, 2015.
23
[DFNS14] Ivan Damgård, Jakob Funder, Jesper Buus Nielsen, and Louis Salvail. Superposition
attacks on cryptographic protocols. In Carles Padró, editor, Information Theoretic
Security, volume 8317 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 142–161. Springer
International Publishing, 2014.
[FGGS09] Edward Farhi, Jeffrey Goldstone, Sam Gutmann, and Michael Sipser. Limit on the
speed of quantum computation in determining parity. Physical Review Letters, 81(24),
1009.
[KK11] Daniel Kane and Samuel Kutin. Quantum interpolation of polynomials. Quantim In-
formation and Computation, 11(1& 2), 2011.
[Sha79] Adi Shamir. How to share a secret. Communications of the Association for Computing
Machinery, 22(11):612–613, November 1979.
[van98] Wim van Dam. Quantum oracle interrogation: Getting all information for almost half
the price. In 39th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 362–
367, Palo Alto, California, USA, November 8–11, 1998. IEEE Computer Society Press.
[Zal99] Christof Zalka. Grover’s quantum searching algorithm is optimal. Phys. Rev. A, 60:2746–
2751, Oct 1999.
24
